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Abstract
An extensive literature discusses the existence of a virtuous circle of expec-
tations that might lead communities to Pareto-superior states among multiple
potential equilibria. It is generally accepted that such multiplicity stems funda-
mentally from the presence of positive agglomeration externalities. We examine
a two-sector model in this class, and look for intertemporal perfect foresight
equilibria. It turns out that under some plausible conditions, positive externali-
ties must coexist with external diseconomies elsewhere in the model, for there to
exist equilibria that break free of historical initial conditions. Our main distin-
guishing assumption is that the positive agglomeration externalities appear with
a time lag (that can be made vanishingly small). Then, in the absence of external
diseconomies elsewhere, the long-run behaviour of the economy resembles that
predicted by myopic adjustment. This ﬁnding is independent of the degree of
forward-looking behavior exhibited by the agents.
∗We are grateful to Rahul Roy and an anonymous referee for comments that improved the ﬁnal
draft. Ray gratefully acknowledges support under Grant SBR-9709254 from the National Science
Foundation. Address correspondence to: Debraj Ray, Department of Economics, Boston University,
270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215. Email: aadsera@volcano.uab.es and debraj@bu.edu
1
1 Introduction
An extensive literature discusses the existence of a virtuous circle of expectations
that might lead communities to Pareto-superior states among multiple potential
equilibria. It is generally accepted that such multiplicity stems fundamentally
from the presence of positive agglomeration externalities. The purpose of this
paper is to examine the role of agglomeration externalities in a fully dynamic
model in which agents exhibit perfect foresight. Under plausible conditions that
we describe below, we show that the generation of equilibria that break free of
initial historical conditions must critically depend on the presence of congestion
externalities elsewhere in the model.
The role of externalities in the process of economic development has occupied
a central place in theories of growth and development. Perhaps the ﬁrst study
along these lines is due to Paul Rosenstein-Rodan [1943]. Authors such as Tibor
Scitovsky [1954], Albert Hirschman [1958] and Gunnar Myrdal [1957] developed
these notions further. More recently, Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny [1989] have
formalized some aspects of the Rosenstein-Rodan viewpoint, making precise the
conditions that are needed for multiplicity of equilibria. The study of such
multiplicity exhibits agglomeration externalities in its own right: a recent issue
of the Journal of Development Economics concentrated entirely on this topic.
By and large, this literature ignores a central question raised by Rosenstein-
Rodan and Hirschman: how does an economy “move from a bad to a good
equilibrium”? We place this entire phrase in quotes because it is imprecise: so
called transitions from one “equilibrium” to another must themselves be viewed
as the equilibria of some encompassing intertemporal process. But this question
is problematic for game theorists (and a fortiori, for applied economists as well).
In pure coordination games (such as those studied by Cooper and John [1988])1
which essentially underly these models, where is the role of history? Why would
an initial coordination failure transmit itself, or persist, over time? This is
the fundamental issue raised (though not answered) by Rosenstein-Rodan and
Hirschman.
We study this issue by placing the static coordination game in the explicit
context of an intertemporal process. Our two-sector migration model has already
served as the canonical parable in part of this literature. In one of the sectors
(the “traditional sector”), the return to each agent is exogenously given. In the
other, “modern” sector, there are agglomeration externalities: the return to each
agent depends positively on the number of agents located there. Viewed as a
static model of locational choice, the model exhibits two equilibria: one in which
everyone is located in the traditional sector, and the other in which everyone is
located in the modern sector. Viewed as a dynamic model of locational choice,
agents take the intertemporal paths of returns in each sector as given, and then
make rational migration decisions to maximize the sum of discounted utility.
1See also Diamond [1982], Bryant [1993], or Chatterjee and Cooper [1989, 1990].
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Such decisions might include, in principle, the option to move back and forth
several times. Each migratory step is costly. A perfect foresight equilibrium has
the additional property that the joint migration decisions generate precisely the
intertemporal path of returns that each agent takes as given.
A similar model has been used by Matsuyama [1991] and Krugman [1991a]2
to show discuss the role played by discounting in the generation of ahistorical
equilibria. If agents discount the future heavily enough, then the intertemporal
equilibrium resembles the path obtained through myopic tatonnement. Initial
conditions (and thereafter, the current discrepancy in the intersectoral rates of
return) determine migratory ﬂows. The sector with the initial advantage will
come to dominate. On the other hand, for discount rates close to zero, other
perfect foresight equilibria appear. These equilibria can break free of initial
conditions, provided that agents harbor common expectations of optimism (or
pessimism) about the eventual fate of the modern sector.
There is merit and insight to these arguments. They certainly allow for out-
comes that we do sometimes see: a burgeoning, self-fulﬁlling move away from
one type of activity (or location, or technology) to another. Our objective is to
make explicit an aspect of these models, and possibly of the coordination frame-
work in general, that remains hidden in the literature that we have seen. The
observation is this: to generate equilibria that break free of historical conditions,
negative agglomeration externalities must be present somewhere, in addition to
the positive agglomeration externalities that are needed to create the problem in
the ﬁrst place. Most importantly, this result is independent of the size of the
degree of forward-looking behavior exhibited by the economic agents, as captured
by their discount factors.
To make this point, we make an assumption that we believe to be eminently
plausible. We assume that the positive agglomeration externalities must manifest
themselves with a time lag.3 We do not restrict the size of this lag in any way.4
In this model, for any positive discount rate, if relocation costs are constant
and independent of the intersectoral allocation of agents, the ﬁnal outcome of any
perfect foresight equilibrium depends entirely on initial conditions. The equilib-
rium paths turn out to be (essentially) the same as if agents were short-sighted.
The same result is true if the relocation cost depends negatively on the number
of agents in the destination sector (which amounts to positive externalities as
well). Thus, paradoxically enough, equilibria which break free of initial history
2See also Fukao and Be´nabou [1993] in this context, and in a related scenario, Chamley and Gale
[1994] and Gale [1993].
3Empirical work on such lags includes the study by Henderson [1994], which reveals the speciﬁc lag
structure at which changes in own-industry employment aﬀect growth in some manufacturing sectors
(at the metropolitan level). Literature on technology investment also stresses the fact that beneﬁts
from investment may take time to ﬂow (Farrel and Saloner 1985; Katz and Shapiro 1986, 1992).
4To be more precise, our assumption of a continuum of agents (as in the Matsuyama and Krugman
studies) allows us to handle arbitrarily small lags. If this is not clear now, it will be as soon as we
state our main result.
3
can exist only if there are diseconomies elsewhere. In this model, such equilib-
ria might exist if relocation costs depend positively on the number of agents in
the destination sector (congestion). We do not construct such equilibria for our
model, as this is not our main focus, but it is easy enough to do so along the
lines discussed by Krugman and Matsuyama.
Once stated, the intuition behind such a result is easy enough to see. Sup-
pose, for instance, that the rate of return in the traditional sector is initially
higher, and then lower, along some equilibrium path. This implies that some
migration must have occured from the traditional to the modern sector. But
because externalities are lagged, the initial migration must have occurred when
current returns were unfavorable. Such migrants can beneﬁt from postponing
their migration decisions, and they will certainly do so if the cost of relocation
is not adversely aﬀected in the process. But this means no one will migrate in
this interim period, and so the positive externalities can never be generated in
the ﬁrst place. With diseconomies in relocation costs, this argument is no longer
valid and such equilibria can be constructed (under some conditions).
In describing myopic tatonnement, Krugman [1991a, p. 657] writes: “The
usefulness of this kind of heuristic approach to dynamics for thinking about
models is so great that we would not propose abandoning it.” In this paper,
we argue that the prediction of myopic tatonnement may have more than just
heuristic appeal on its side. In economies of atomistic agents, the path of myopic
adjustment may still be the most likely equilibrium outcome if no congestion cost
is added to the model.
2 The Model
An economy has two regions, A and B. A total capital (or labor) endowment of
K¯ is split at date 0 between the two regions. Denote by K the capital in region
B, so that K¯ −K is the capital stock in region A. Capital invested in Region A
yields a ﬁxed rate of return, normalized to zero. Region B’s rate of return r is
taken to depend positively on its capital endowment:
r = f(K) (1)
where f is continuous, strictly increasing, and f(0) < 0 < f(K¯).
Imagine that there is a continuum of agents, and each agent owns a single unit
of capital. Capital is free to move between regions but each relocation entails
a nonnegative cost. Assume that the cost of moving from B to A is given by a
nondecreasing function cˆA(K) and that the cost of moving from A to B is given
by a nonincreasing function cˆB(K), where K is to be interpreted, in each case,
as the population of capital in the destination region. Say that either of these
cost functions exhibits congestion if it increases, at least over some interval, in
K. Agents make decisions in the way described below.
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First let us track the relevant prices. Let γ ≡ {r(t), cA(t), cB(t)}∞t=0 be some
point expectation about the path (measurable in time) of returns and relocation
costs in each region. Future returns are discounted in the standard way, using a
discount rate ρ. Denote by V (γ, i, t) the optimal value to an agent in region i,
i = A,B, beginning at time t, when the commonly anticipated path of returns is
γ. Then by standard dynamic programming arguments, an agent in region i will
switch sectors at time t if V (γ, i, t) < V (γ, j, t) − cj(t), will stay if the opposite
inequality holds, and will be indiﬀerent if equality holds.
A path γ is an equilibrium if it is generated by the optimal decisions of
(almost) all agents in response to γ.
To discuss the generation of γ, consider now some exogenously given mea-
surable path {K(t)}∞t=0. 5 We assume that there is some lag (however small) in
the speed at which external eﬀects induced by incoming/outgoing factors aﬀect
the going rates of return. From this point of view, we regard the return function
f(K) as representing a “long run level” of the rate of return, once the economy
has settled at a certain level of capital K. We assume that at date 0, r(0) is
precisely f(K(0)) (see (1)). Thereafter, we introduce an increasing function g,
with g(0) = 0, such that
r˙(t) = g(f(K(t))− r(t)). (2)
Thus, the rate of return at any date “chases” the “appropriate” rate of return
corresponding to the division of the capital endowment at that date. The speciﬁc
functional form of g(.) determines the speed at which returns adjust. In any case,
capital owners will always get paid r(t), in accordance to their real marginal
productivity at that point of time.
Several economic situations conform quite naturally to this speciﬁcation. In
models of search or matching, the productivity of some ﬁxed amount of capital
may depend on the ability of that capital to ﬁnd partners (with more capital),
say, because of minimum scale requirements in production. This ability, in turn,
will depend on the total amount of capital in the economy (see, e.g., Diamond
[1982]). Note that a discontinuous jump in the capital stock will lead to a smooth
intertemporal increase in productivity as long as the process of “matching part-
ners” takes place in continuous time. Likewise, if one replaces “capital” by
“population” and “rate of return” by “utility”, the concentration of population
in a particular geographical region may provoke large amounts of productive ac-
tivity and a variety of goods and services, attracting still more people because
of the greater utility to be had (Krugman [1991b]). Again, the degree of pro-
ductive activity might react smoothly to a sudden inﬂux of population (perhaps
because the information regarding a larger market needs time to permeate to all
the producers).
5Note that we do not a priori restrict it to be a continuous path, so that self-fulﬁlling “jumps” are,
in principle, permitted.
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Appendix 1 in the paper provides a highly stylized example that makes ex-
plicit the process through which intertemporal smoothing can occur.
Thus a path of capital allocations {K(t)} generates a path of returns {r(t)}
using (2), and a path {cA(t), cB(t)} using the relationships ci(t) = cˆi(K(t)) for
all t. Note that we could introduce lags into the c functions as well. We do not
do this: it keeps the notation simple and in any case our focus is primarily on
lags in the ﬂow rates of return.
Note that the literature on coordination (e.g., Cooper and John [1988]) and
on the role of history versus expectations (e.g., Matsuyama [1991], Krugman
[1991a]) eﬀectively assumes that g is “inﬁnitely sensitive”, so that r(t) is always
exactly equal to f(K(t)).6
3 History and Coordination Failure
If agents migrate only in response to current rate diﬀerentials, the resulting
equilibrium is equivalent to myopic “tatonnement”. For instance, if K(0) is such
that f(K(0)) < 0, capital in B will move to A to cash in on the rate diﬀerential
and the process will ultimately lead to the specialization of the economy in
sector A. The reverse will be true whenever f(K(0)) > 0 . With positive
relocation costs, there is an interval of initial conditions that will persist; no
one ﬁnds it worthwhile to switch sectors. However, as Matsuyama [1991] and
Krugman [1991a] observe, this strong history-dependence is driven by myopia.
There might be “forward-looking” equilibria which lead, for instance, to ultimate
specialization in either sector even though initial conditions do not favor this
sector. It turns out, though, that such outcomes are impossible in the model of
the previous section, irrespective of the degree of farsightedness.
To state this result, say that an intertemporal equilibrium is exclusively his-
tory dependent if the long-run outcome either equals the initial allocation, or
entails migration only to the sector that is initially proﬁtable. Note that myopic
tatonnement has the same properties, though obviously the exact path may be
diﬀerent. The main similarity is that no room is left for farsighted expectations.
Proposition 1 Assume f(K(0)) = 0. Unless the cost of relocation exhibits
congestion, every equilibrium must be exclusively history dependent, irrespective
of the discount rate.
This proposition summarizes the main point of the paper: unless rates of
return reﬂect instantaneously the external eﬀects of incoming factors, the ability
to generate “ahistorical equilibria” and to attain Pareto superior outcomes de-
pends critically on how relocation costs are aﬀected by intersectoral allocation.
In particular, Proposition 1 shows that if each agent faces a relocation cost that
6This is to be contrasted with the more recent work of Gale [1993] and Chamley and Gale [1994]
where lags also play a role.
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is nonincreasing in the number of destination agents, the long-run behavior of
the economy is fully determined by initial conditions. Note that this argument
includes the case in which movement is costless, or in which the costs of migra-
tion are ﬁxed. independent of intersectoral allocation. If rates of return adjust
to going factor endowments with a lag, however small, agents will want to post-
pone their migration decisions to currently unproﬁtable areas, until returns rise
suﬃciently to justify the move. With a continuum of agents, this externality
cannot be internalized, so that all equilibria with ahistorical steady states are
knocked out. In particular, adverse initial conditions are perpetuated. Thus, the
only equilibria that survive involve either perpetuation of the initial allocation
or movement to initially proﬁtable areas.7
Our observation is independent of the magnitude of discounting, and of the
degree of responsiveness of returns (as long as it is not instantaneous). Thus by
a minor and reasonable weakening of one of the assumptions in the literature,
we obtain a class of models where expectations are dwarfed by history, where
initial conditions determine the ﬁnal equilibrium. Of course, if rates of return
adjust instantaneously, then expectations-driven equilibria are possible.
We reiterate: our claim is not that ahistorical equilibria are impossible. But
that, in this class of models, in addition to the intersectoral agglomeration exter-
nalities, the “migration technology”, is crucial to understand the sources of such
equilibria. The only way in which such outcomes can occur is by introducing
a cost to postponement; i.e., by making future relocation costs increase in the
stock of settlers in our case.
Thus it appears (though we have not provided a formal proof of this) that in
this general approach, expectations can dominate history only through an inter-
esting juxtaposition of agglomeration externalities in one sector (production) and
congestion externalities in another (migration).8 The reason why migrants might
move to a currently unfavored sector, despite the lag in the realization of exter-
nalities, is that a later move will involve a higher cost. It is in this sense that the
technology of adjustment costs is crucial to the existence of expectations-driven
equilibrium.
4 Concluding Comments
Why some countries or regions develop and others do not crucially depends on
when the beneﬁts from the investment/migration decision will accrue and how
7This does not rule out multiplicity. It is possible, for instance, that if f(K(0)) > 0, both the
initial allocation and a jump to the B region by everybody in A belong to a set of simultaneously
sustainable equilibria. If initially f(K(0)) < 0, there is always a unique equilibrium: either the initial
allocation or the complete abandonment of region B.
8In the case where the adjustment cost depends on the ﬂow of migration, it turns out that the
existing literature that we are aware of (see, for example, Kemp and Wan [1974], Mussa [1978], and
Krugman [1991a]) also invoke congestion (rather than agglomeration) in migration costs.
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costly the move is. It is unclear that congestion in relocation is always a good
assumption. To the extent that this is the case, it may be diﬃcult to invoke
coordination games to explain some great migrations. For instance, being one
of the ﬁrst settlers in the Far West was possibly far more costly than arriving
there later by train. In other cases, such as in the sudden growth of new cities
in developing countries, congestion may well be a reasonable postulate.
In a similar way, the results of the paper shed some light on the problem of
technology adoption (see, e.g., Arthur [1984], David [1985], Chamley and Gale
[1993] and Gale [1993]). A technology already in place may be dominated by
an alternative technology if the latter is adopted by a signiﬁcant group of ﬁrms.
However, if these potential returns only appear over time and the cost of adoption
decreases with the number of entrants, everyone waits for others to move ﬁrst,
negating the adoption of the technology even with forward-looking agents. If,
on the other hand, the costs of adoption increase with the spread of the new
technology, such equilibria are possibly sustainable.9 Thus society may gain by
being organized in such a way that being the ﬁrst in the business matters.
The standard role for intervention, which is weakened by the possibility of
ahistorical equilibria, may need to be reexamined. As usual, we may think of the
government as involved in the task of building up a critical mass in cases where
history acts as a constraint. But the focus of this paper reveals another role as
well. The initial losses that migrating agents incur in moving to a poor region
may be partially alleviated by subsidies (such as tax holidays) in the hope of
more than recovering the cost in future ﬁscal revenues. The idea is to mimic or
create the equivalent of congestion in the initial costs of relocation.
9Perhaps this “explains” why new software, such as Internet browsers, need to be given away, with
prices rising later as the number of devotees to that software swell.
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Appendix 1
Suppose that n workers in a region have productivity a1, a2, ...an. Let a be the
average productivity. If inidividual productivity is not observed by competitive
employers and the production technology is linear with production coeﬃcient
normalized to one, then the equilibrium wage will be a˜, where this is the ex-
pectation of average productivity that employers calculate given common beliefs
about the probability distribution of each individual’s productivity.
Now suppose that the productivity of an individual is positively aﬀected by
meeting other individuals that he has not met before. Speciﬁcally, suppose that
every encounter with a new individual adds δ to productivity.
Encounters take place in the following way. There is a Poisson process with
given parameter: whenever a realization occurs, two (or more pairs of) indi-
viduals are taken randomly from the population and matched. A productivity
upgrade occurs if and only if a match is new.
Take as given the following initial conditions. Each individual located in
the region at date 0 has the an initial productivity b. There is some initial
number n(0) of such individuals. Thereafter migration occurs as a function n(t)
which starts at time 0, jumps upwards periodically, and ﬁnally ﬂattens out when
n(t) = N (think of N as total population).
The productivity of each individual is a random variable: for any such indi-
vidual i at date t, ai(t) = bi + δmi(t), where bi is the initial productivity of the
migrant (which is b for the original settlers at date 0), and mi(t) is the num-
ber of new meetings i has had with other incumbents in the region up to date
t. Clearly, ai(t) is a random variable that begins at the initial productivity bi,
exhibits jumps at random dates along its sample paths, and converges almost
surely to the value b(t0) + δ(N − 1).
We assume that each new migrant (after date 0) is initially housed by an in-
cumbent “relative”. These relatives are uniformly distributed among the incum-
bent settlers. The going productivity of the relative is assumed to be instantly
transmitted to the newcomer at the time of migration. Thereafter, the new mi-
grant becomes an incumbent with something to teach as well as something to
learn, exactly the same way as described in the previous paragraph.
Let a(t) be the average productivity of all members of the region at date t; of
course, a(t) is still a random variable in its own right (with jumps on its sample
paths). It is easy to check that a(0) = b and (given the assumptions about new
arrivals), a(t) increases up to the limit b+ δ(N −1). But employers do not know
the average productivity at date t for sure because they do not know about the
pattern of meetings that have occurred economy-wide, neither do they know the
pattern of initial matching between migrants and relatives, which they take to be
random. Take the expectation of a(t, n) at each date t using the characteristics
of the underlying Poisson process; call this a˜(t). The (straightforward) proof of
the following fact is omitted but is available on request:
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a˜(t) is a deterministic, continuous function of t, which starts at b and con-
verges monotonically to b+ δ(N − 1).
Remark 1. The assumption that new migrants costlessly acquire the productiv-
ity of the incumbents they go and live with, and thereafter proceed to teach and
learn just as the incumbents do, is only used to ensure that a jump in n does not
instantly (and temporarily) lower expected average productivity at the date of
the jump (as it would, for instance, if new migrants came in with a productivity
of b). [This sort of temporary downward jump, it should be added, would only
strengthen the results of the main model.]
Remark 2. As written down, this example is unrealistic and is only meant to
capture the process of “intertemporal smoothing” in the rates of return in the
simplest possible way. In particular, to completely ﬁt our model, it should be the
case that if there is migration out of the region, then productivity in the region
should fall over time. This sort of extension is easy enough to accomplish by
putting in a depreciation factor for productivity that is constantly compensated
for by new encounters with other incumbents. Then it will be the case that a
lowering of n will cause an economy-wide depletion of average productivity, as
encounters become fewer, and the economy must move down to its new steady
state level of productivity.
Appendix 2
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the case in which f(K(0)) < 0. The case
f(K(0)) > 0 can be settled by a parallel argument.
Fix any equilibrium γ. We claim that K(t) ≤ K(s) for all t ≥ s, which settles
exclusive history-dependence.
Suppose this is false for some t′ and s′. Then, indeed, there is some t and s
with t > s, K(t) > K(s), and r(τ) < 0 for all s ≤ τ ≤ t∗ for some t∗ > t (this last
observation uses the assumption that returns do not adjust instantaneously).
First note that
K(t∗) ≥ K(τ) for all τ ∈ [s, t∗]. (3)
For suppose this is not true; then K(t∗) < K(τ) for some τ ∈ [s, t∗). Because
K(t) > K(s) by assumption and t ∈ [s, t∗), we may conclude that there exist
{t1, t2, t3} in the interval [s, t∗] such that K(t1) < K(t2) > K(t3), while r(τ) <
0 for all τ ∈ [s, t∗]. This means that (at least) two costly switches between
sector A and B are optimal while sector A earns a higher return throughout, a
contradiction.
Now return to the main proof. So far, we know that there is a positive
measure of agents between s and t such that for each of them, at the time τ of
their move, V (γ,B, τ)−cˆB(Kτ ) ≥ V (γ,A, τ). But for each such person, denoting
the discount rate by ρ, we see that
V (γ,A, τ) ≥ e−ρ(t∗−τ)[V (γ,B, t∗)− cˆB(K(t∗))]
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>∫ t∗
τ
e−ρ(z−τ)r(z)dz + e−ρ(t
∗−τ)[V (γ,B, t∗)− cˆB(K(t∗))]
>
∫ t∗
τ
e−ρ(z−τ)r(z)dz + e−ρ(t
∗−τ)V (γ,B, t∗)− cˆB(K(τ))
= V (γ,B, τ)− cˆB(K(τ)).
The ﬁrst inequality follows from the agent’s option to stay in Sector A until t∗,
and then switch. The second inequality follows from the fact that t∗ > τ for all
s ≤ τ ≤ t and r(z) < 0 for all τ ≤ z ≤ t∗. The third inequality follows from
discounting and (3), so that cˆB(Kτ ) > e−ρ(t
∗−τ)cˆB(Kt∗), and the last equality
follows from the observation that that two or more switches between τ and t∗
are clearly suboptimal.
Thus we have a contradiction to our presumption that V (γ,B, τ)− cˆB(Kτ ) ≥
V (γ,A, τ), which completes the proof.
11
References
1. Arthur, B. (1984), “Competing Technologies and Lock-In by Historical
small Events: The Dynamics of Allocation under Increasing returns” (CEPR
Publication, Stanford University).
2. Bryant, J. (1982), “A Simple Rational Expectations Keynes-Type Model”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 97, 525–529.
3. Chamley, C. and Gale, D. 91994), “Information Revelation and Strategic
Delay in a Model of Investment”, Econometrica 62, 1065–1086.
4. Chatterjee, S. and Cooper, R. (1989), “Multiplicity of Equilibria and Fluc-
tuations in Dynamic Perfectly Competitive Economies”, AEA Papers and
Proceedings 79, 353–357.
5. Chatterjee, S., Cooper, R. and Ravikumar, B. (1990), “Participation dy-
namics: Sunspots and Cycles’, NBER Working Paper Series N. 3438.
6. Cooper, R. and John, A. (1988) “Coordinating Coordination Failures in a
Keynesian Model”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, 441–464.
7. Diamond, P. (1982), “Aggregate Demand Managment in Search Equilib-
rium”, Journal of Political Economy 90, 881–894.
8. Farrell, J. and Saloner, G. (1985) “Standardization, Compatibility and In-
novation”, Rand Journal of Economics 16, 70–83.
9. David, P. (1985), “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY”, American Eco-
nomic Review, Papers and Proceedings 75, 332–337.
10. Fukao, K. and Benabou, R. (1993), “History versus Expectations: A Com-
ment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 535–542.
11. Gale, D. (1995), “Dynamic Coordination Games”, Economic Theory 5,
1–18.
12. Henderson, J.V. (1994) “Externalities and Industrial Development”, NBER
Working Paper N. 4730.
13. Hirschman, A. (1958), The Strategy of Economic Development, New Haven:
Yale University Press.
14. Katz, M.L. and C. Shapiro (1986), “Technology adoption in the presence
of network externalities”, Journal of Political Economy 94, 822–841.
15. Katz, M.L. and C. Shapiro (1992), “Product introduction with network
externalities”, Journal of Industrial Economics 40, 55–83.
16. Kemp, M. C. and Wan, H. Y. 91974), “Hysteresis of Long-Run Equilibrium
from Realistic Adjustment Costs.” In Trade, Stability and Macroeconomics,
edited by George Horwich and Paul A. Samuelson. New York: Academic
Press.
12
17. Krugman, P. (1991a), “History versus Expectations”, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 106, 651–667.
18. Krugman, P. (1991b), “Increasing Returns and Economic Geography,” Jour-
nal of Political Economy 99, 483–499.
19. Matsuyama, K. (1991), “Increasing Returns, Industrialization and, Inde-
terminacy of Equilibrium”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 616–650.
20. Murphy, K., Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1989), “Industrializtion and the
Big Push”, Journal of Political Economy 97, 1003–1026.
21. Mussa, M. (1978), “Dynamic Adjustment in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson
Model”, Journal of Political Economy 68, 775–791.
22. Myrdal,G. (1957), Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions London,
Duckworth.
23. Rosenstein-Rodan, P. (1943), “Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and
Southern Europe”, Economic Journal 55, 202–211.
24. Scitovsky, T. (1954), “Two Concepts of External Economies,” Journal of
Political Economy 62, 143–151.
25. Shleifer, A. (1986), “Implementation Cycles”, Journal of Political Economy
94, 1163–1190.
13
